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Abstract Happiness research is one of the most vivid and fruitful parts of modern
economics. The focus is on empirical findings. In contrast, theoretical work has
been rather neglected. The paper deals with three areas needing more analytical
work: the choice or imposition of comparison or reference groups; and the extent,
speed and symmetry of adaptation to positive and negative shocks on happiness. In
both areas, theoretical propositions are derived which can in the future be empiri-
cally tested. The third area relates to the political economy of happiness. Many
governments intend to take the happiness index as a criterion of how successful their
policies are. As a consequence, survey respondents get an incentive to misrepresent
their happiness level, and governments to manipulate the aggregate happiness
indicator in their favor. A country’s constitution must induce governments to
carefully observe human rights, democracy, the decentralization of political deci-
sion making, and market institutions and provide people with the possibility to
acquire a good education and find a suitable job.
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1 Great achievements
Economic happiness research has been a considerable success. It has become one of
the most challenging and visible parts of economic science, opening new and
unexpected insights both for theory and policy. Over the last years, many issues of
the measurement of subjective well-being have been clarified, and we now know the
major determinants of happiness:1 genetic, socio-demographic, economic, social
and political factors. Their influence has been discussed in several survey papers,
such as Frey and Stutzer (2002, 2005a), Dolan et al. (2008), Stutzer and Frey (2010),
Frey and Steiner (2012) and most recently Becchetti and Pelloni (2013); the results
will not be repeated here.
Various applications of happiness research have opened new avenues for research.
It suffices to mention the social evaluation of external events (such as terrorist
incidents, see Frey et al. 2009) or of smoking bans on both smokers and nonsmokers
(Odermatt and Stutzer 2013). Happiness research allows scholars to take into account
aspects such as weakness of will. This weakness cannot be analyzed by standard
neoclassical economics, which assumes that individuals always and everywhere
behave in a way maximizing their utility. This assumption excludes behavior where
individuals fail to act in their best interest, even though for example weakness of will
plays a large role in everyday life. It is therefore important to know how damaging it
actually is and what can be done about it. A negative relationship between
overconsumption and life satisfaction exists, for example for alcohol consumption
(Veenhoven 2003), obesity (Stutzer 2009). Benesch et al. (2010) show that for many
people, it is tempting to view TV rather than to pursue more engaging activities,
because of its immediate benefits at negligible immediate marginal costs. As a
consequence, individuals with incomplete control over, and foresight into, their own
behavior watch more TV than they consider optimal for themselves and their well-
being is lower than what could be achieved.
Great advances have also been made concerning causality, e.g., that higher
income raises happiness, but happier persons are also better able to raise their
income (De Neve and Oswald 2012). The same holds for other determinants of
happiness, in particular unemployment and health. The major technique for
identifying causality is to consider exogenous changes in the determinants of
happiness, for instance winning money at a lottery, which can be considered an
unpredicted event. The result shows that a gain in income indeed raises happiness
(Gardner and Oswald 2007). Another technique is to consider persons living under
similar conditions, such as nuns. Based on this, the effect of happiness on health has
been studied. Before young women enter the religious order, their self-declared
happiness levels differ. Their subsequent monastic lives are quite similar; they are
subject to essentially the same influences. It turns out that those nuns who have been
happier before entering the monastery live considerably longer (Danner et al. 2001).
This supports the idea that happiness raises health and longevity.
1 Following the literature, the word ‘‘happiness’’ is used for convenience to denote the more scientific
term ‘‘subjective well-being’’. This paper deals more narrowly with ‘‘life satisfaction’’ derived from the
answers to the survey question: ‘‘Taken overall, how satisfied are you with the life you lead’’. In the case
of employment relationships, happiness is identified with job satisfaction.
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Past research has been concentrated on empirical findings based on the
exploitation of large databases. In the extreme, researchers were satisfied to find
any determinant of happiness, as long as it was statistically significant. McCloskey
and Ziliak (1996) and Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) have castigated such an
approach for years. It may be argued that it is always possible to find some estimated
coefficient that surpasses the conventional barriers (mostly 95 and 99 %) to be
considered ‘‘statistically significant.’’ But this significance is unrelated to content—
and, of course, what should count is a relationship representing substantive issues.
The neglect of theoretical work starkly contrasts with the very large number of
empirical estimations. It may be due to the considerable amount of potential
influences, which makes it difficult if not impossible to construct a formal
integrating the crucial aspects.
This paper discusses three areas in which more thorough and more novel
theoretical work is needed: comparisons, adaptation and happiness policy. Section 2
deals with the comparison or reference groups which people choose to take or which
are imposed on them. Section 3 discusses the extent, speed and symmetry of
adaptation to positive and negative shocks on happiness. In both sections, several
theoretically derived propositions are made which can be empirically tested in the
future. Section 4 considers the political economy of happiness taking account of
reactivity. The latter occurs when governments take the happiness index as a
criterion of how successfully they act. The last concludes.
2 Comparison to reference groups
One of the major insights of happiness research is that individuals have a strong
tendency to compare their own situation to that of other people. Happiness research
demonstrates that absolute income has strongly decreasing marginal happiness and
pronounces the importance of relative income.
2.1 Empirical results
When considering personal reference groups, happiness research commonly relates
the level of income (or wealth) of an individual to average income in the respective
society (on this and the following, Becchetti and Pelloni (2013) provide extensive
references to the literature). Changes in relative income have much larger effects on
happiness than changes in absolute income. This is a rather crude procedure because
a person generally knows only a limited number of other persons. The information
provided by the media certainly extends the reference group to a larger set of
people, but that set still remains sketchy and might not have much of an impact on
people’s reference groups. Thus, persons of low income do not normally compare
their situation to that of the extremely rich, who live in other parts of the city or
region and to whom they never connect. A more sophisticated approach explicitly
considers the social environment in which persons live, in particular their friends
and colleagues. Men, for example, compare themselves less often to family
members than do women, and the self-employed are in general less likely to draw
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such social comparisons (Clark and Senik 2010). It has been shown that individuals
observe the consumption pattern of others, even without personally knowing these
people (Winkelmann 2012).
The effects of both absolute and relative income on happiness are small when
compared to the effects of several non-pecuniary factors. Comparisons are not only
made with respect to income but also made with respect to other determinants of
happiness, such as unemployment. While losing one’s job strongly reduces
happiness, the loss is less marked when other persons in the region are also out of
work. The individual unemployment effect is even neutralized in areas with a very
high employment deprivation (around 24 %, see Clark 2003). For those working,
having an unemployed partner is detrimental to happiness, but for the unemployed it
is beneficial.
Further, there seems to be substantial heterogeneity in the groups to which
individuals compare. This diversity seems to be partly endogenous, relating to the
type of regular social interactions that individuals experience.
2.2 Propositions
The empirical results reached so far do not allow us to draw firm conclusions about
how individuals compare themselves to other persons. Firstly, it is unclear what the
relevant reference group is in a particular case. Secondly, the reference group is not
static but adjusts to various influences. It is, for instance, well known that when
individuals’ income rises, they start to compare themselves to persons who also
dispose of greater income.
Two possibilities may be distinguished:
(a) Individuals can be assumed to be able to choose their reference groups. Utility
maximizers may be taken to consider countervailing influences. On the one hand,
they obviously feel happier if they compare themselves downwards, for instance to
persons with lower income. On the other hand, they may be aware that their ‘‘animal
spirits’’ are strengthened if they compare themselves to persons with higher income.
Such a comparison induces them to exert more effort in order to raise their future
income and happiness. Persons focusing more on the present put more weight on the
first, persons with lower discount rates on the second, consideration. This
relationship is open to empirical testing.
Proposition 1 The more far-sighted individuals are the more they compare
themselves with persons of higher income, and the less happy they are (keeping all
other influences on happiness constant).
This proposition can be tested by first determining individuals’ discount rates of
the future, and then econometrically estimating a happiness function with the
discount rate as one of the determinants. However, this procedure is not
unproblematic because the extent of discounting tends to depend on the happiness
level. As it has been found (Abdel-Khalek 2006) that happier people are more
forward looking, a suitable instrument for the rate of discount must be used in order
to correctly estimate the effect of the choice of the reference group on happiness.
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(b) The reference group may be assumed to be determined by outside factors
imposed on individuals. For instance, persons growing up in a very rich household
find it difficult, or impossible, not to compare their present situation with that in
their youth. However, it may be feasible to indirectly influence one’s reference
group. This may be achieved by taking a more basic decision about the type of life
one wants to pursue. Individuals deciding to study finance and then work in a bank
generally must be aware that the point of reference is monetary income. Once that
step is taken, the reference group is composed of persons with higher, and often
much higher, income. In contrast, persons choosing to work in the charitable sector
expose themselves to vastly different influences. They mostly come in contact with
persons of low income, which influences the set of persons whom they compare
themselves with. The same occurs if people choose to work in the public sector, in
which salaries tend to be lower than for similar work performed in the private
sector. These considerations again lead to propositions amenable to empirical tests.
Proposition 2 The richer individuals’ parents are the more they tend to compare
themselves with higher income persons, and the less happy they are (ceteris
paribus).
Proposition 3 Individuals working in the financial sector tend to compare
themselves with persons of higher income than do individuals working in the
charitable or in the public sectors. The former therefore tends to be less happy than
the latter (ceteris paribus).
While proposition 2 points to a setting where factors are imposed from outside,
proposition 3 includes the possibility of selection effects. People working in banks
may be more prone to comparing themselves along the income dimension, while
people with less regard for monetary aspects are more likely to join the voluntary or
public sector.
Many other testable propositions with respect to income comparisons can, of
course, be developed. Visibility of differences certainly plays a major role. The
more intensively the traditional and social media invite, and even impose,
comparisons with others’ achievements (e.g., promotion on the job, acquisition of
status goods, luxurious vacation destinations), the more elevated is the reference
group. This applies not only to persons in the same society, but also across nations
and continents. The impact of relative comparisons also changes according to the
perception of vertical mobility. In counties with high perceived vertical mobility,
the income gap to the reference group has less negative effects (see e.g., Senik
2005).
Institutional factors impact the reference group people compare themselves with.
A case in point is the publication of employees’ salaries, which affects the reference
levels obtaining. This effect has recently (Card et al. 2012) been tested using a
randomized variation in access to information on the salaries of co-workers. The
study shows that employees are indeed interested in knowing the salary of other
employees, especially of those in the same department. This information has a
strong effect on how relative pay affects job satisfaction. The results of the study
suggest that information on other employees’ salaries reduces job satisfaction
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among employees with salaries below the median of their department and
occupational group. In contrast, job satisfaction of individuals with salaries above
the median is unaffected.
3 Hedonic adaptation
When the determinants of happiness change, individuals adjust their evaluations of
happiness. This adaptation can vary in three regards: (1) the extent of adjustment to
the previous happiness level; (2) the speed of adjustment; and (3) the symmetry, i.e.,
whether an adjustment following a beneficial change takes the same form as an
adjustment to an unfortunate event. The last aspect is not further considered in this
paper; it would deserve to be analyzed in its own right.
3.1 Empirical results
There are a great number of studies showing that individuals adjust their happiness
level when they are subject to exogenous shocks (for literature references see again
Becchetti and Pelloni 2013). Well known is the downward adjustment occurring
after winning a substantial amount of money at a lottery and the accompanying
increase in happiness. The ‘‘Easterlin Paradox’’ claims that rising real per capita
income does not raise happiness on the country level, but this result is controversial.
Several studies (e.g., Deaton 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, 2013) reject this
paradox, at least in its strict sense. Nevertheless, most scholars undertaking research
on the relationship between income and happiness hold that happiness does not
increase at the same rate as income, i.e., that either some extent of adaptation to
higher income levels takes place or that comparison with increasingly wealthy
persons takes place (Luttmer 2005).
Recent research has shown that individuals also completely adapt to non-
monetary shocks, except for unemployment (Clark et al. 2008). It does not matter if
these events are positively related to happiness, such as marriage or birth of a child,
or negatively, such as divorce, an accident leading to disability (Oswald and
Powdthavee 2008), widowhood or layoff. In general, the patterns of adaptation are
remarkably similar by sex. A special case is the effect of getting unemployed. While
both men and women suffer a drastic decline in their happiness, women recover
after some time while men do not. Related to the development of happiness over
time is a second phenomenon, namely anticipation. Anticipation effects are
strongest for events that are expected, as are often a divorce or a marriage. However,
the strongest impact on life satisfaction often appears at the time when the events in
question occur.
3.2 Propositions
The many empirical results concerning the adaptation of happiness to shocks are
rarely based on theoretical considerations but are the result of exploiting and
interpreting given data such as the German Socio-Economic Panel.
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There seems to be a difference between psychologists and economists engaging
in this research. Many psychologists assume that there is a homeostatic force in
human beings re-establishing a ‘‘set point of happiness,’’ which differs between
persons. Efforts to raise happiness by changing its determinants only have a
transitory effect. For many economists, the idea of a set point of individual
happiness is rather far off. This may be due to the influence of standard economics
where according to the received utility function, an increase in income produces
higher utility.
The extent and form of adaptation of happiness can be assumed to depend on
various factors:
(a) Individuals are more strongly induced to adapt their happiness levels when
they perceive no alternative available to them. Most of them realize that it is useless
to mourn about an unfortunate event that cannot be altered. Indeed, to keep
mourning about an unachievable state can be considered a pathological trait
(Stroebe et al. 2000).
Proposition 4 The fewer alternatives the individuals affected perceive, the harder
they are hit by a negative shock and the stronger and the faster they adapt their
happiness to the previous level.
(b) Individuals may be subject to pressures to adapt which differ between
identifiable conditions. For instance, when the competitive struggle for survival is
strong—as it has been in most periods of mankind—individuals cannot afford not to
mentally adapt to new conditions. The more they internalize the prevailing
conditions in which they live, the better are they able to survive. In contrast, in a
modern social welfare state, there is less pressure to adjust to new conditions.
Proposition 5 When hit by a negative shock, individuals adapt more slowly, and
to a lesser extent, in a social welfare state than under conditions of intense
competitive survival.
(c) Persons with many social contacts, i.e., having an intact family, friends and
acquaintances, are helped and supported after a negative shock to adapt to new
conditions. After a positive shock, the support via social contacts enables them to
feel less pressure to adapt. In contrast, isolated persons may find it more difficult to
adjust and therewith are likely to suffer a greater loss of happiness when they are hit
by negative shocks.
Proposition 6 Individuals with more social contacts adjust less quickly to
beneficial, and more quickly to unfortunate events than do more isolated persons.
There may be many other interesting theoretical propositions with respect to the
extent and speed of adaptation as well as to possible asymmetries in reactions to
positive and negative shocks. The same holds for the preceding theoretical
discussion on comparisons. A third field that deserves more attention by academics
is the political economy of happiness research.
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4 Policy consequences
Happiness research is faced by fundamental problems of reactivity, rarely taken into
account in existing research (Frey and Stutzer 2009, 2012; Frey and Gallus 2012).
As has been well established, surveys on life satisfaction have been a useful and
good proxy to the theoretical concept of utility (e.g., Kahneman 2003). Changes in
life satisfaction reflect well how people ‘‘really’’ feel; they also closely correlate
with objective observations such as smiling. The situation has, however, changed
since politicians such as (former) French president Sarkozy and British Prime
Minister Cameron have jumped on the bandwagon of happiness. They proclaimed
their intent to use the aggregate happiness index as a criterion supposedly reflecting
their performance. What had worked before—namely, the dependability of the
surveys on life satisfaction—no longer works because of two kinds of reactivity
(Frey and Gallus 2013a):
(a) When the individuals surveyed about their happiness know that politicians use
the results for their own political purposes they are induced to give strategic
answers. For example, persons with a left-wing ideology may be reluctant to state
that they are particularly happy if the government in power is of a right-wing
orientation. Being aware that stating that they are happy benefits the politicians they
dislike, they tend to state a lower happiness level than they would otherwise report.
Conversely, if a left-wing government is in power, they tend to distort their
happiness level in the upward direction.
(b) Governments have a strong incentive to manipulate the overall happiness
level as they know that the voters now judge them on this criterion. This type of
reactivity has taken place since the advent of aggregate economic indicators.
Changes in national income, unemployment, inflation, fiscal deficit and public debt
are politically important and have therefore been manipulated by governments. The
same occurs when happiness is taken to be a criterion of government performance.
However, the macro-economic indicators are (mostly) based on (more or less)
objective data such as turnover and value added. In contrast, aggregate happiness
indicators are derived from intently subjective data and are therefore easier to
manipulate.
It may be argued that the insights gained by happiness research should directly
inform policy makers and be considered a criterion of success. Hence, it is a
worthwhile endeavor to consider how the risks attached to one single national
happiness index may be mitigated. One possibility to overcome the distortions
induced by reactivity is to prevent the government from manipulating the aggregate
happiness index. A country’s Statistical Office could be assigned the task to
construct the index. However, in most countries, even those with a long democratic
tradition, the Statistical Office is at best formally independent, and often subject to
outright influence by the politicians in power (similar to Central Banks). Another
possibility is to impose a strict protocol on how to construct the aggregate happiness
index. This would be similar to the construction of national income indices.
However, this requirement has not prevented governments to include (in order to
magnify economic success) or to exclude (in order to get higher subsidies from
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other countries) parts of or the entire shadow economy. Not even a strict protocol
overcomes the government’s strong incentives to manipulate the aggregate
happiness index. Another problem for happiness policies arises when individuals
mispredict the future utility of goods consumed and activities undertaken (Frey and
Stutzer 2005b). Goods and activities characterized by stronger intrinsic aspects
(such as spending time with family and friends and pursuing hobbies) are
undervalued compared to those characterized by stronger extrinsic aspects (such as
income). Whether the effects of mispredicting utility are mitigated or are even
accentuated in the political process is not clear ex-ante and depends on the political
conditions.
The issue of reactivity has to be addressed at a more fundamental, social—rather
than administrative—level (Frey and Stutzer 2009; Frey and Gallus 2013b). A
country’s constitution must induce and force governments to obey human rights,
democracy, the decentralization of political decision making and free markets. On a
somewhat lower constitutional level, the constitution must give citizens the
possibility to acquire the best possible education and to find a job matching their
abilities and preferences. As a result, the citizens will be able to enjoy high
happiness. The government’s task is to set the conditions such that citizens can
attain happiness rather than directly seeking to make citizens happy. History shows
that most, if not all, governments which claimed, and perhaps even endeavored, to
make their citizens happy ended up as a happiness dictatorship. The French
Revolutionaries whose effort led to ‘‘la terreur’’ (the Reign of Terror, from 1793 to
1794) provide a case in point.
5 Concluding remarks
Happiness research is one of the most interesting parts of modern economics, and
more broadly of the social sciences. The research has been concentrated on
empirical findings based on the exploitation of large databases. In the extreme,
researchers have been satisfied when they were able to find statistically significant
determinants of happiness. In contrast, theoretical work has been somewhat
neglected.
Three areas are discussed in which more thorough and more novel analytical
work is needed. The first area refers to the comparison or reference groups which
people choose to take or which are imposed on them. The second area concerns the
extent, speed and symmetry of adaptation to positive and negative shocks on
happiness. In both areas several propositions are made which can in the future be
empirically tested.
The third area relates to the political economy of happiness taking account of
reactivity. The latter occurs when governments take the happiness index as a
criterion of how successful their policies are. As a consequence, the people surveyed
get an incentive to misrepresent their happiness level, and governments get an
incentive to manipulate the aggregate happiness level in their favor. The political
economy aspect is particularly challenging as it is a result of happiness research. It
is exactly its success that induces politicians to employ it as a favorable criterion of
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their own performance. Administrative solutions to overcoming distorted happiness
indicators are unlikely to work. Rather, a country’s constitution must induce
governments to carefully observe human rights, democracy, the decentralization of
political decision making, and the freedom of markets. On a somewhat lower
constitutional level the constitution must give citizens the possibility to acquire a
good education, and to find a suitable job.
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